A quick thought here, based on a heads-up to me on Peaceful Science on a thread that, for some reason, doesn’t give me the ability to reply. No matter, because I have more space to reply here.
Matthew Dickau says: “Also, on some versions of Molinism, God could still make that pool shot even if there is fundamental indeterminism in the laws of physics. Omniscience is useful like that.”
And Joshua Swamidass replies in agreement: “Yup there is that Molinism thing too, even though @jongarvey hates it.”
I hate it mainly because it seems to confound logic. Consider, for example, any normal situation of cause and effect whatsoever. That is, the causes “A” determine the outcome “B”:
<1> A [entails] B
Now consider the indeterminate situation – essentially one of ontological randomness – apparently posed by Matthew and Joshua (and presumably other Molinists like Willam Lane Craig). In that case, definitionally,
<2> A [does not entail] B
In other words the causes A either have no predisposition whatsoever to cause B, or at least only have some ontologically unpredictable chance of doing so.
But in the Molininist scheme, God’s purpose (B) nevertheless does arise infallibly from (A). A “truly random” quantum event, say, does exactly what God wishes it, and foresees it, to do. In that case, the situation is not <1>, but <2>, because A, de eventu leads infallibly to B in the only world that exists.
What, then makes the difference, that a set of events A, which has of itself no causal entailment of B, nevertheless infallibly produces B? The sole difference is that God has created A with the purpose of causing B, rendering an ineffective chain of causation effective despite its insufficiency. That makes God the direct efficient cause of the situation, ie,
A [entails] B
but only because “God” is now associated with A.
Now consider another situation. The circumstances in the world (A´) are insufficient to cause the resurrection of a crucified man from death (B´). This leads to exactly the same situation as before:
<2´> A´ [does not entail] B´
Yet by God’s efficient causation, that situation is changed for Jesus, and so the crucified Christ must rise, and de eventu,
<1´> A´ [entails] B´
In this case we call this a purposeful act of God within creation, perhaps even a miracle (though more properly actually an act of new creation). We do not speculate about God’s choosing to create, Molinistically, a possible universe in which he foresees his Son rises from the dead by chance.
The point is that, once God’s final purposes and role as Creator are taken into account, the whole concept of “indeterminacy” loses all meaning. It is a redundant term. It all boils down to insufficent causes being non-causes, but God the supreme efficient (First) Cause bringing into being what would otherwise not be.
Is there a problem with my reasoning there?